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Recent findings have shown that mind-wandering – the occurrence of stimulus-
independent and task-unrelated thoughts – is associated with negative affect and lower
psychological well-being. However, it remains unclear whether this relationship is due to
the occurrence of mind-wandering per se or to the fact that people who mind wander
more tend to be generally less attentive to present-moment experience. In three studies,
we first validate a French translation of a retrospective self-report questionnaire widely
used to assess the general occurrence of mind-wandering in daily life – the Daydreaming
Frequency Scale. Using this questionnaire, we then show that the relationship between
mind-wandering frequency and psychological distress is fully accounted for by individual
differences in dispositional mindful awareness and encoding style.These findings suggest
that it may not be mind-wandering per se that is responsible for psychological distress,
but rather the general tendency to be less aware and attentive to the present-moment.
Thus, although mind-wandering and present-moment awareness are related constructs,
they are not reducible to one another, and are distinguishable in terms of their relationship
with psychological well-being.
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INTRODUCTION
When reading a book, driving to work, or performing other com-
mon daily tasks, our mind frequently drifts away from our current
activity and focuses instead on internal thoughts and images that
are unrelated to the present situation (e.g., remembrances of the
past or thoughts about future events). This particular kind of
thought, often referred to as mind-wandering or daydreaming, can
be defined as stimulus-independent and task-unrelated thoughts
(SITUTs), in the sense that their content (i) is not the direct reflec-
tion of current sensory input and (ii) is unrelated to the task being
performed at the moment of their occurrence (Stawarczyk et al.,
2011a,b). Experience sampling studies have shown that SITUTs
are an ubiquitous phenomenon experienced by virtually every-
one (Singer and McCraven, 1961), and cover 30–50% of our daily
thinking time (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010).
This frequent occurrence of SITUTs in daily life has led to the
suggestion that these thoughts serve a purpose in terms of ongo-
ing cognitive processes (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Research
focusing on the content of SITUTs has demonstrated that most
of these thoughts are self-related (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood
et al., 2011), temporally oriented toward the future (Smallwood
et al., 2009b), and directed toward planning and preparing for
impending events (Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a). It
has therefore been proposed that SITUTs play an important role
in the processing of personal goals and concerns (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006; Klinger, 2009). SITUTs may allow us to manipulate
and organize internal information, to solve problems that require
computation over long periods of time,and to create effective plans
governing our future behaviors in concordance with our personal
aims and aspirations (Binder et al., 1999).
While SITUTs may support specific cognitive processes, a grow-
ing body of research also indicates that the occurrence of SITUTs
is not without deleterious consequences (for recent reviews, see
Klinger, 2009; McVay and Kane, 2010; Christoff et al., 2011;
Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2012). SITUTs have
been associated with decreased performance on a wide array of
activities, including reading (Smallwood, 2011; McVay and Kane,
2012b), car driving (He et al., 2011), paying attention during lec-
tures(Lindquist and McLean, 2011; Risko et al., 2012), reaction
time tasks (Smallwood et al., 2004a; McVay and Kane, 2012a),
and memory tasks (Smallwood et al., 2003, 2004c). Further-
more, recent electrophysiological studies have shown that sen-
sory evoked potentials to both task-related and task-unrelated
stimuli were decreased while people were experiencing SITUTs
in comparison to when their attention was fully focused on-
task (Barron et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2011). Together, these
findings suggest that SITUTs are a resource-consuming phe-
nomenon in which attention to sensory information is reduced
in favor of internally generated cognitions, resulting in a state
of perceptual decoupling from the here and now (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2010, 2011; Schooler et al.,
2011).
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Besides their influence on present-moment attention, SITUTs
also seem to impact psychological well-being and mental
health. There is substantial evidence that people who experience
more SITUTs suffer from increased depressive symptomatology
(Giambra and Traynor, 1978; Watts et al., 1988; Smallwood et al.,
2004b, 2007; Burg and Michalak, 2011) and report less life sat-
isfaction (Mar et al., 2012). Of particular interest, Killingsworth
and Gilbert (2010) recently used an experience sampling proce-
dure to assess the occurrence of SITUTs in the daily life of 2250
participants. They found that mind-wandering sampled at time
t−1 was a predictor of a lower mood at time t, whereas mood at
time t was unrelated to the presence of mind-wandering at time
t+ 1. Although some laboratory findings have recently revealed
that this relationship might not be totally unilateral (Smallwood
et al., 2009a; Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011), the results by
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) suggest that SITUTs might be
one of the causes rather than the consequence of unhappiness
and psychological distress. Other research suggests that factors
such as the valence of thought content, repetitiveness, and level of
construal (abstract versus specific) play important roles in deter-
mining the negative emotional consequences of SITUTs (Watkins,
2008, 2010).
In short, although mind-wandering seems to serve adaptive
functions such as planning and preparing for future events, it also
tends to be associated with negative affect and lower psychological
well-being. It remains unclear, however, whether the relationship
between mind-wandering and psychological well-being that has
been documented in previous studies is due to the occurrence of
SITUTs per se. Recent findings have revealed that the frequency
of SITUTs is higher in individuals who are less aware of their
present-moment experience, as assessed by dispositional measures
of mindful awareness (Burg and Michalak, 2011; Mrazek et al.,
2012), and it is well-known from research on trait mindfulness
that decreased attention to the present-moment is associated with
lower psychological well-being (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Brown
et al., 2007; Jermann et al., 2009; Keng et al., 2011). Mindfulness
involves the ability to anchor one’s attention on what is occurring
(e.g., sensations, thoughts, feelings), and the ability to intentionally
switch attention from one aspect of experience to another (Brown
et al., 2007; Keng et al., 2011). People who are less mindful may thus
be less aware of SITUTs when they occur and less able to regulate
and manage these thoughts (e.g., to view them as passing mental
events and to let them go), thus increasing their negative emotional
impact (Frewen et al., 2008; Keng et al., 2011)1. Therefore, it could
be that the relationship between SITUT frequency and psycho-
logical distress is not due to the occurrence of mind-wandering
per se, but instead to the fact that people who present more mind-
wandering episodes are generally less attentive to present-moment
experience (and thus less able to regulate their thoughts).
1It should be noted that although the constructs of mind-wandering and mindful-
ness are related (Mrazek et al., 2012), they are not equivalent. Mindfulness is not
antithetical to thoughts, but rather fosters a different relationship to them: it entails
the ability to decenter from one’s thoughts and view them as passing mental events
rather than to identify with them and believe thoughts to be accurate representations
of reality (Brown et al., 2007; Keng et al., 2011).
In the present study, we tested this hypothesis by examining
the relationships between various self-report instruments of gen-
eral daily life experiences that included measures of psychological
distress and SITUT frequency, as well as two measures reflective
of a general tendency to have one’s attention decoupled from the
present-moment: (i) dispositional mindful awareness, which indi-
cates the degree to which individuals are attending to the here
and now (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Jermann et al., 2009), and (ii)
encoding style, which indicates the degree to which individuals
pay careful attention to the external environment (i.e., external
encoding style) versus less careful attention, caused by attending
relatively more to internal mental processes (i.e., internal encod-
ing style; Lewicki, 2005; Herndon, 2008; Billieux et al., 2009). We
predicted that if a general tendency for decreased attention to
the present-moment is responsible for the relationship between
SITUTs and psychological distress, then SITUT frequency should
not remain a significant predictor of psychological well-being
once the influence of mindful awareness and encoding style had
been taken into account. To test this hypothesis, we performed
hierarchical regression analyses and we also computed a multi-
ple mediation model to examine whether mindful awareness and
encoding style fully mediated the relationship between SITUT
frequency and psychological distress.
As there currently exists no validated instrument in French lan-
guage to assess the general extent to which individuals experience
SITUTs in daily life, we dedicated a first set of studies to the val-
idation of a French version of the Daydreaming Frequency Scale
(DDFS; Giambra,1993). This self-report questionnaire is currently
the most widely used retrospective measure of mind-wandering
and daydreams. It is sensitive to the effect of aging on SITUT
frequency (Giambra, 1993) and is related to depressive sympto-
matology (Giambra and Traynor, 1978), mindful awareness, and
the frequency of task-unrelated thoughts probed during mindful
breathing tasks (Mrazek et al., 2012). In Study 1A, we investigated
the factorial structure of the French version of the questionnaire
using a principal component analysis. We also examined whether
scores on the DDFS were related to age, to the general tendency
to experience positive and negative affect in daily life, and to the
frequency and clarity with which individuals see themselves in the
future. In Study 1B, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) to further examine the factorial structure of the DDFS. In
addition, we investigated whether the DDFS was related to mea-
sures of anxiety and depression and, to ensure that the validity of
the scale is not excessively flawed by its retrospective nature, we also
examined whether DDFS scores are related to an online measure
of SITUTs sampled during an attentional laboratory task, the Sus-
tained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997).
Then, in Study 2, we used the validated adaptation of the DDFS to
examine whether SITUT frequency still accounts for psychological
distress after controlling for individual differences in the tendency
to pay attention to the present-moment.
STUDY 1A
In this study, we first examined the factorial structure of the French
translation of the DDFS using a principal component analysis.
Next, we examined whether scores on this scale were related to par-
ticipants’ age and to the general experience of negative and positive
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affect in daily life. In light of previous research, we expected that
the rate of SITUTs reported on the DDFS would decrease with
age (Giambra, 1989, 1993, 2000; Jackson and Balota, 2012) and
would be associated with negative affect (Giambra and Traynor,
1978; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). We also aimed at exploring
the previously documented relationship between mind-wandering
and self-related future thoughts (Smallwood et al., 2009b, 2011;
Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a). Recent findings suggest
that thinking about future selves can be dissociated in two com-
ponents: (i) the frequency with which people spontaneously think
about themselves in the future, named “Frequency,” and (ii) the
vividness with which they “see” themselves in the future, named
“Clarity” (McElwee and Haugh, 2010). As previous studies have
found that most SITUTs are self-related and oriented toward the
future, we expected that scores on the DDFS would be related
to the frequency of future self thoughts. The two dimensions of
thinking about oneself in the future were assessed with a French
adaptation of the Future Self Thoughts questionnaire (FST; McEl-
wee and Haugh, 2010) that was created for the purpose of the
present study.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 100 native French-speaking individuals (42 men) from
the Belgian general population volunteered to participate in the
study (see Table 1, sample A, for age and years of education).
Questionnaires
Daydreaming frequency scale. The DDFS is one of the 28 scales
composing the Imaginal Process Inventory, a 344 item ques-
tionnaire designed for in-depth assessment of individuals’ inner
mental life (Singer and Antrobus, 1963, 1970, 1972). The French
version of the DDFS consists of 12 items adapted from the orig-
inal English version of the questionnaire (Giambra, 1993), and
was developed using the back-translation method (e.g., Carlson,
2000). The 12 items of the original DDFS were first translated
into French by two of the authors (David Stawarczyk and Arnaud
D’Argembeau). Another independent translator then translated
the French version back into English. The original version and the
back-translation of the DDFS were compared, and the discrep-
ancies between these two English versions were discussed until a
satisfactory solution was found by the different translators, and the
French version was modified accordingly. The translation of the
questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. Respondents are asked
to rate the extent to which they experience daydreaming in their
daily life with reference to a five-point Likert-scale, ranging from
“A”to“E.”The wording of the response options to which the letters
correspond differs among the items but the higher placed letters
in the alphabetical order always correspond to an increased expe-
rience of SITUTs in daily life. Values of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 were assigned
to the options depending on their ordinal position on the contin-
uum. Previous studies have demonstrated the good psychometric
properties of the original DDFS. For instance, an exploratory fac-
tor analysis performed on the 28 scales of the Imaginal Process
Inventory completed by 1353 adults from the general population
demonstrated that each of the 12 items of the DDFS loaded on
a single exclusive factor with minimum values of 0.50 (Giambra,
Table 1 | Means, standard deviations, and ranges for the different
variables assessed in samples A, B, and C.
Variable Mean (standard deviation) Range
SAMPLE A (N=100)
Age 31.59 (11.52) 18–58
Achieved years of education 14.18 (2.16) 9–19
DDFS 39.41 (9.76) 18–58
FST frequency 19.42 (6.27) 6–36
FST clarity 18.40 (5.47) 5–30
PANAS positive affect 33.06 (5.38) 15–44
PANAS negative affect 22.64 (5.59) 11–40
SAMPLE B (N=64)
Age 22.50 (2.07) 19–26
Achieved years of education 14.67 (1.83) 11–18
% On-task reports 41.82 (20.73) 3.33–96.67
% TRI reports 24.32 (11.65) 3.33–56.67
% ED reports 15.21 (9.27) 0–40
% SITUT reports 18.65 (17.10) 0–76.67
DDFS 43.47 (7.75) 25–60
CES-D 15.09 (8.79) 2–43
BAI 8.58 (5.86) 0–29
SAMPLE C (N=100)
Age 22.73 (3.23) 18–30
Achieved years of education 14.25 (2.01) 9–21
DDFS 37.69 (9.20) 17–58
MAAS 63.90 (10.29) 37–88
ESQ 16.86 (5.40) 6–28
PHQ-4 2.57 (2.64) 0–11
DDFS, Daydreaming Frequency Scale; FTS, Future Self Thoughts questionnaire;
PANAS, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (trait form);% On-task reports,
percentage of on-task reports made to the thought-probes during the Sustained
Attention to ResponseTask (SART);%TRI reports, percentage of task-related infer-
ence reports;% ED reports, percentage of external distraction reports;% SITUT
reports, percentage of stimulus-independent, and task-unrelated thought reports;
CES-D, Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression scale; BAI, Beck Anxiety
Inventory; MAAS, Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; ESQ, Internal and External
Encoding Style Questionnaire; PHQ-4, Patient Health Questionnaire-4.
1980). Other analyses demonstrated that the internal consistency
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of the original DDFS was 0.91 and
its test-retest reliability was 0.76 for an interval of 1 year or less
(Giambra, 1993).
Future self thoughts questionnaire. The FST (McElwee and
Haugh, 2010) consists of 11 items designed to assess two dimen-
sions of thoughts about one’s future selves: (i) Frequency, the
extent to which respondents spontaneously think of themselves
in the future (items 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11), and (ii) Clarity, the vividness
with which respondents “see” themselves in the future (items 1, 3,
5, 9, 10). Respondents are asked to rate the extent to which each
statement describes how they think or act in their daily life with ref-
erence to a six-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (not at all true for
me) to 6 (completely true for me). Items 1, 3, 5, and 10 are reverse-
scored. Cronbach’s alphas of the Frequency and Clarity scales in
the original validation study of the FST were respectively 0.79 and
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0.86. The French version of the FST was developed using the same
back-translation method as described above for the DDFS. The
translation of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
The positive and negative affect schedule. The Positive and Neg-
ative Affect Schedule (PANAS) consists of two 10-item mood scales
that respectively measure positive and negative affect, both as states
and traits (Watson et al., 1988). Respondents are asked to rate the
extent to which they experience particular emotions with refer-
ence to a five-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or
not at all) to 5 (very much). Only the trait form was used in the
present study (French version by Vautier and Raufaste, 2003): par-
ticipants were asked to rate the extent to which they experience
each emotion in general. Cronbach’s alphas of the positive affect
and negative affect scales were respectively 0.88 and 0.87 in the
original validation study of the PANAS; the corresponding values
were 0.77 and 0.74 in the present study.
Procedure
Participants from sample A were tested individually. Each partic-
ipant provided written informed consent and was first asked for
demographic information before completing the questionnaires
in the following order: DDFS, FST, and PANAS. This study and
the other studies reported in this paper were part of a broader
research project that was approved by the Ethical Committee of
the faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Liège.
RESULTS
Psychometric properties of the French version of the DDFS
The factorial structure of the French version of the DDFS was
analyzed using a principal component analysis. We conducted a
parallel analysis (Horn, 1965; O’Connor, 2000) to determine the
number of factors to be extracted. In the parallel analysis method,
random data sets are generated by permutations of the raw data
set, and the eigenvalues from the real data are compared to the
eigenvalues from the random data. The number of factors to be
extracted corresponds to the number of eigenvalues that explains
more variance in the real data than in the random data (Reise
et al., 2000; Hayton et al., 2004). The resulting eigenvalues for
the random data are shown in Figure 1A, with the eigenvalues
from the real data, which clearly indicates that a single-factor
should be retained. The resulting single-component solution is
presented in Table 2 with the individual component loadings for
the variables included. The internal reliability of the scale was esti-
mated using Cronbach’s Alpha value; values greater than 0.70 are
generally considered acceptable (Bland and Altman, 1997). The
Cronbach’s Alpha value for the French version of the DDFS was
0.91, indicating that the internal reliability of the scale is very good.
Psychometric properties of the FST
The factorial structure of the French translation of the FST was
also analyzed with a principal component analysis. Horn’s par-
allel analysis showed that the two first eigenvalues from the real
data were higher than those in the random data indicating a two
component solution, as shown in Figure 1B. The resulting two
component solution using a Varimax normalized rotation is pre-
sented in Table 3 with the individual component loading for the
variables included. An orthogonal method of rotation was used as
the two dimensions of future self-thought are theoretically con-
ceived as being unrelated (McElwee and Haugh, 2010). Factor 1
corresponds to the Frequency scale of the original version and
Factor 2 to the Clarity scale. All items clearly loaded onto only
one-factor with the exception of Item 6 “When I daydream, I often
see myself as I may be in the future,” with a loading of 0.62 onto
Factor 1 and a loading of 0.46 onto Factor 2. Because this item is
more consistent with Factor 1 (frequency) both empirically and
conceptually, we retained it in this factor for subsequent analy-
ses. Cronbach’s Alpha values were 0.79 for Factor 1 and 0.77 for
Factor 2, indicating that the internal reliability of both scales is
satisfactory.
Correlational analyses
Means and standard deviations for age, number of achieved years
of education, scores on the positive, and negative affect scales of
FIGURE 1 | Scree plots for the principal component analyses.
(A,B) respectively represent the eigenvalues for the principal
component analyses performed on the DDFS and FST items for the
real data sets, as well as the mean eigenvalues and upper 95th
percentiles for the same analyses performed on 5000 random data
sets that were obtained by permutations of the real data following
Castellan’s algorithm (Castellan, 1992). PA, parallel analysis. N = 100
(sample A).
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality Science and Individual Differences September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 363 | 4
Stawarczyk et al. Mind-wandering, psychological well-being, and present-moment awareness
Table 2 | Pattern matrix factor loadings for the principal component analysis of the DDFS items (N =100, sample A).
DDFS items (item #) Factor 1
(Variance explained) 50.95%
• Daydreams and fantasies make up... (2) 0.83
• I daydream... (1) 0.83
• Whenever I have time on my hands, I daydream... (10) 0.80
• As regards daydreaming, I would characterize myself as someone who... (3) 0.79
• I lose myself in active daydreaming (9) 0.73
• When I am not paying attention to some job, book, or TV, I tend to be daydreaming... (5) 0.70
• I daydream at work (or school)... (7) 0.69
• When I am at a meeting or show that is not very interesting, I daydream rather than pay attention... (11) 0.67
• Recalling things from the past, thinking of the future, or imagining unusual kinds of event occupies... (8) 0.66
• Instead of noticing events or people in the world around me, I will spend approximately... (6) 0.61
• On a long bus, train, or airplane ride I daydream... (12) 0.61
• I recall or think over my daydreams... (4) 0.59
Factor loadings exceeding 0.4 are highlighted.
Table 3 | Pattern matrix factor loadings for the principal component analysis of the FST items (N =100, sample A).
FST items (item #) Factor 1 Factor 2
(Variance explained) 29.60% 25.42%
• My thoughts tend to wander toward imagining possible futures for myself. (8) 0.88 −0.01
• It is common for me to spend time thinking about myself as I might be in future stages of life. (7) 0.87 0.10
• I tend to think about myself as I might be in the future even when I don’t want to be thinking about it. (11) 0.69 −0.02
• When I daydream, I often see myself as I may be in the future. (6) 0.62 0.46
• Thinking about myself in the future often makes me have strong feelings (whether happy or sad). (4) 0.58 −0.16
• I often picture myself in the future in different ways and think about the various paths that could lead me to those different
futures. (2)
0.49 −0.07
• Images of myself in the future are very “hazy,” not clear at all.* (5) −0.08 0.79
• My future seems vague and uncertain to me. * (1) −0.16 0.77
• When I picture myself in the future, I see clear and vivid images. (9) 0.33 0.69
• I really find it hard to predict what I might be like in the future.* (3) 0.10 0.68
• My future is too uncertain for me to plan very far ahead.* (10) −0.27 0.66
Factor loadings exceeding 0.4 are highlighted. *: reverse-scored items.
the PANAS, as well as the Clarity and Frequency scales of the
FST, and the DDFS are presented in Table 1 (sample A). Corre-
lations between the variables are presented in Table 4. Results of
the correlation matrix including all the variables showed a pos-
itive relationship between the DDFS and the Frequency scale of
the FST. This result indicates that participants who reported to
experience more SITUTs in their daily life also reported more
spontaneous thoughts about their future self. As expected, scores
on the DDFS were also positively related to the negative affect scale
of the PANAS and were negatively related to age, indicating that
participants with higher rates of SITUTs were younger and gen-
erally experienced more negative emotions in daily life. It is also
worth noting that the Clarity scale of the FST was not significantly
related to SITUT frequency. Next, we performed partial correla-
tion analyses (see Table 4) to examine whether the relationships
between the different scales remained significant after controlling
for age and educational level. Results showed that the correlations
between the DDFS and FST Frequency, and between the DDFS
and negative affect, remained significant after partialing out the
influence of age and educational level. Finally, we also checked
for a possible effect of gender on these results. Mean comparisons
showed no gender difference for the different scales, and control-
ling for gender did not influence the significance of the correlation
analyses.
DISCUSSION
This first study showed that the French translation of the DDFS has
a single-factor structure and good internal reliability. In addition,
we demonstrated that scores on this scale are negatively related
to age, which is concordant with the previous findings that the
frequency of SITUTs decline in aging (Giambra, 1989, 1993, 2000;
Jackson and Balota, 2012). We also found that the frequency of
SITUTs is related to negative affect, which is also in line with pre-
vious findings (Giambra and Traynor, 1978; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010). Finally, our results provide additional specification
of the previously observed relationship between mind-wandering
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Table 4 | Correlation matrices of study 1A variables (N =100, sample A).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Age – – – – – –
Educ. 0.06 – – – – –
DDFS −0.32** −0.01 0.36** −0.13 −0.02 0.20*
FST freq. −0.38** 0.07 0.43** 0.09 −0.09 0.20
FST clar. 0.09 0.27** −0.14 0.07 0.25* −0.02
PANAS pos. 0.06 0.09 −0.03 −0.10 0.27** −0.01
PANAS neg. −0.11 −0.27** 0.21* 0.19 −0.10 −0.04
Educ., number of achieved years of education; DDFS, Daydreaming Frequency Scale; FTS freq., frequency scale of the Future Self Thoughts questionnaire; FST
clar., clarity scale of the Future Self Thoughts questionnaire; PANAS pos., positive affect scale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (trait form); PANAS neg.,
negative affect scale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (trait form). Values below the diagonal are the correlations between all the variables; Values above
the diagonal are the correlations between the variables after controlling for Age and Educ.; *significant at p<0.05 (two-tailed); **significant at p<0.01 (two-tailed).
and future thinking. On the one hand, the finding that the Fre-
quency dimension of the FST correlates with the DDFS is con-
sistent with previous experience sampling studies which showed
that imagining oneself in the future represents a substantial part of
the content of SITUTs probed during cognitive tasks (Smallwood
et al., 2009b, 2011; Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a).
Interestingly, however, we found that the Clarity dimension of
the FST was unrelated to the self-reported tendency to experience
SITUTs in daily life. These results suggest that although SITUTs
are often self-related and future-oriented, they do not necessarily
feature clear and vivid images of the self in the future.
STUDY 1B
Study 1A showed that the French version of the DDFS has a single-
factor structure. In Study 1B, we further tested the validity of
this single-factor structure with a CFA. Additionally, we exam-
ined whether the retrospective measure of SITUT frequency in
daily life given by the DDFS is related to the frequency of SITUTs
sampled during the SART (Robertson et al., 1997). The purposes
of this analysis were twofold. First, we wanted to ensure that the
estimate of SITUT frequency provided by the DDFS is not exces-
sively flawed by the retrospective nature of this instrument; we
thus examined whether the scores on the DDFS correlate with
an “online” measure of SITUTs. Second, we wanted to examine
the specificity of the DDFS as a measure of SITUTs in com-
parison to other kinds of conscious experiences that can occur
when one’s mind is not fully focused on the task at hand, such
as thoughts related to the appraisal of the task (i.e., task-related
interferences) and distractions by task-unrelated exteroceptive
perceptions and interoceptive sensations (i.e., external distrac-
tions). To do so, we used a newly validated experience sampling
method which permits to clearly distinguish SITUTs from other
kinds of conscious experiences during laboratory task perfor-
mance (Stawarczyk et al., 2011a,b). We expected that DDFS scores
would be related to the frequency of SITUTs during the SART,
but not to the frequency of task-related interferences and exter-
nal distractions. Finally, besides the online sampling of SITUTs,
Study 1B also included questionnaire measures of depressive
and anxious symptomatology to further document the relation-
ship between psychological well-being and SITUTs revealed in
Study 1A.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 164 native French-speaking individuals (54 men) from
the Belgian and Swiss general populations volunteered to partici-
pate in Study 1B (samples B and C, see Table 1) and were included
in the CFA. Other analyses of Study 1B were conducted on 64 of
these participants (31 men; sample B).
Questionnaires and task
Daydreaming frequency scale. See the Methods Section of “Study
1A” for a detailed description of this scale. Cronbach’s alpha for
the DDFS was 0.88 in the present study.
Center for epidemiological studies-depression scale. The Cen-
ter for Epidemiological Studies-Depression scale (CES-D) is used
to assess depressive symptomatology in non-clinical populations.
It comprises 20 items assessing the presence of depressive symp-
toms in the past week with reference to a four-point Likert-scale
ranging from 0 (never, rarely: less than 1 day) to 3 (frequently, all
the time: between 5 and 7 days). Items 4, 8, 12, and 16 are reverse-
scored (original version, Radloff, 1977; French version, Fuhrer and
Rouillon, 1989). Cronbach’s alpha for the CES-D was 0.85 in the
original validation study of the scale and was 0.89 in the present
study.
Beck anxiety inventory. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; origi-
nal version, Beck et al., 1988; French version, Freeston et al., 1994)
is used to assess anxiety in adults during the last 7 days and com-
prises 21 items. Respondents are asked to rate how much they have
been affected by certain anxiety symptoms (emotional, physiolog-
ical, and cognitive) in the past week on a four-point Likert-scale
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely). Cronbach’s alpha for the
BAI was 0.92 in the original validation study of the scale and was
0.78 in the present study.
Sustained attention to response task with thought-probes. The
version of the SART used in this study is similar to the one used in
Stawarczyk et al. (2011a). Stimuli (numbers between 1 and 9) were
presented sequentially at the center of the screen. Participants were
asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible to the numbers
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and to withhold their response when presented with the num-
ber 3 (the target stimulus). The probability of the target stimulus
was 11%. The interstimulus interval was 2000 ms, and the dura-
tion of each stimulus (target and non-targets) was 500 ms. The
task comprised 30 blocks whose duration was either 25, 35, 45,
55, or 65 s. Each block was immediately followed by a thought-
probe which interrupted the task. For each probe, participants
were asked to characterize the ongoing conscious experience they
had just prior to the probe. Four possible choices were provided:
(i) on-task reports: the participant’s attention and thoughts were
fully focused on the task-related stimuli; (ii) task-related inter-
ferences reports: the participant experienced thoughts about the
task that did not help him/her to have the best possible per-
formance on the current ongoing trials (e.g., thoughts about
task duration or about the participant’s overall performance);
(iii) external distractions reports: the participant’s attention was
focused on stimuli that were present in the current environment
but unrelated to the task at hand (e.g., exteroceptive perceptions
or interoceptive sensations); and (iv) mind-wandering reports:
the participant had his/her attention decoupled from the exter-
nal environment and was experiencing thoughts unrelated to the
task at hand (e.g., thoughts about what the participant did last
evening). In addition to the thought-probes, participants were
asked directly after the SART to complete the thinking content
component of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Matthews
et al., 1999), which retrospectively assessed the frequency with
which they experienced SITUTs and task-related interferences dur-
ing the SART. The scale did not show satisfactory psychometric
properties in the present sample, however, and will not be analyzed
further.
Procedure
All participants from samples B and C were tested individually and
provided written informed consent. Each participant was asked for
demographic information at the beginning of the testing session.
Participants from sample B completed the SART before the ques-
tionnaires, which were administered in the following order: DDFS,
CES-D, and BAI. Participants from sample C completed the ques-
tionnaires in the following order: DDFS, Internal and External
Encoding Style Questionnaire (ESQ), MAAS, and Patient health
questionnaire-4 (PHQ-4; see Study 2 for more detail about the lat-
ter three instruments). In addition to the measures reported here,
participants from Sample B and C completed a series of cognitive
tasks (assessing attentional control abilities) at the beginning of
the testing session. These tasks were not relevant to the aims of
Studies 1B and 2 and will not be discussed further here.
RESULTS
Confirmatory factor analysis of the DDFS
The one-factor structure found in Study 1A for the DDFS was
tested via a CFA computed with Lisrel 8.8 (Jöreskog and Sör-
bom, 1996) and performed on the total number of participants
from samples B and C (i.e., 164 participants). The maximum
likelihood method was performed on the covariance matrix of
the DDFS raw scores for each item. Goodness of fit was tested
with the χ2 (a non-significant value corresponds to an accept-
able fit). The χ2 is known to increase with sample size, however,
and it has been emphasized that it is unusual to obtain a non-
significant χ2 when performing CFA on self-report question-
naires (Byrne, 1994). Therefore, the model fit was assessed by
determining whether the observed χ2 value was less than three
times the model degrees of freedom (Schermelleh-Engel et al.,
2003; Iacobucci, 2010). In addition, three indices of model fit
were computed: the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA), the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR),
and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). RMSEA and SRMR val-
ues respectively below 0.08 and 0.10 represent an acceptable fit
of the model, and the lower the better (Schermelleh-Engel et al.,
2003). CFI values above 0.95 represent an acceptable fit (values
closer to 1.00 represent better fit; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003;
Hooper et al., 2008). Results indicated that the χ2 statistic for the
model was significant χ2 (54)= 107.685, p< 0.001, and the χ2/df
value was 1.994. In addition, we obtained a RMSEA= 0.078, a
SRMR= 0.046, and a CFI= 0.979. The combination of these four
indices indicated an acceptable fit.
The DDFS, online measures of SITUTs, and levels of anxious and
depressive symptoms
Means and standard deviations for the proportions of each of the
four kinds of conscious experiences sampled during the SART
(being fully focused on-task, task-related interferences, external
distractions, and SITUTs), as well as DDFS, CES-D, and BAI
scores are presented in Table 1 (sample B). Correlation analy-
ses between the different variables are presented in Table 5. The
results mainly showed that participants who scored higher on
the DDFS reported more mind-wandering episodes and made
fewer reports of being fully focused on-task during the SART.
On the other hand, reports of task-related interferences and exter-
nal distractions during the SART were unrelated to the DDFS
scores. Regarding the CES-D and BAI, we found that a higher
self-reported frequency of SITUTs in daily life was related to
higher levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms during the
past week. We also checked for the presence of gender effects in
this study. Mean comparisons only showed a significant effect of
gender for the percentage of external distraction reports made
during the SART, with women reporting more external distrac-
tions than men [t (62)= 2.27; p= 0.03; women= 17.68± 9.74;
men= 12.58± 8.11]; controlling for gender did not influence the
significance of the correlation analyses.
DISCUSSION
In Study 1B, we validated the single-factor structure of the French
translation of the DDFS with a CFA. We then showed that the
retrospective measure of SITUTs in daily life provided by the
DDFS is related to an online measure of mind-wandering dur-
ing the SART. This finding of a concordance between trait and
state measures of SITUTs indicates that the validity of the DDFS
is not excessively flawed by the retrospective nature of this ques-
tionnaire. Moreover, scores on the DDFS were unrelated to other
kinds of conscious experiences that occur when one’s mind is
not fully focused on-task, namely task-related interferences, and
external distractions (Stawarczyk et al., 2011a,b). These results
demonstrate the specificity of the DDFS as a measure of SITUTs
relative to the other kinds of distracting conscious experiences
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Table 5 | Correlation matrix of Study 1B variables (N =64, sample B).
% On-task %TRIs % EDs % MW DDFS CES-D
DDFS −0.34** 0.11 0.07 0.30*
CES-D −0.22 0.22 −0.18 0.22 0.37**
BAI −0.20 0.28* 0.20 −0.05 0.28* 0.33**
On-task, percentage of on-task reports made to the thought-probes during the Sustained Attention to ResponseTask (SART);TRIs, percentage of task-related inference
reports made to the thought-probes during the SART; EDs, percentage of external distraction reports made to the thought-probes during the SART; MW, percentage of
mind-wandering reports made to the thought-probes during the SART; DDFS, Daydreaming Frequency Scale; CES-D, Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression
scale; BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory. *Significant at p<0.05 (two-tailed); **significant at p<0.01 (two-tailed).
investigated here during the SART. Finally, we found that SITUT
frequency was related to depressive and anxious symptomatology,
confirming that mind-wandering is related to lower psycholog-
ical well-being (Giambra and Traynor, 1978; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010; Burg and Michalak, 2011).
STUDY 2
Having established the validity of the DDFS as a self-report mea-
sure of the general frequency of SITUTs in daily life, we aimed
in Study 2 to examine whether the relationship between mind-
wandering and lower psychological well-being that has been doc-
umented in previous studies, as well as in the present study, can
be accounted for by the extent to which individuals tend to be
generally aware of the present-moment. Numerous studies on dis-
positional mindfulness have found that decreased attention to the
here and now is related to lower psychological well-being (Brown
and Ryan, 2003; Brown et al., 2007; Jermann et al., 2009; Keng
et al., 2011). Although some recent findings have revealed that
SITUT frequency is related to lower mindful awareness (Burg and
Michalak, 2011; Mrazek et al., 2012), no study to date has exam-
ined whether individual differences in present-moment attention
can account for the relationship between SITUT frequency and
psychological distress.
Here, we tested this hypothesis by using two different self-
report measures indicative of present-moment attention in daily
life. The first measure was the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
(MAAS), a single-dimension scale specifically designed to assess
the frequency of open and receptive attention to, and awareness of
ongoing events and experiences during everyday activities (MAAS;
Brown and Ryan, 2003; Jermann et al., 2009). The second mea-
sure was encoding style, as indexed by the ESQ (Lewicki, 2005;
Billieux et al., 2009). The ESQ is based on the assumption that
the perception of environmental objects involves both encoding
stimuli (perceptual features) from the environment and retriev-
ing concepts (schemata) from long-term memory that fit these
stimuli. Lewicki (2005) further proposes that there are individ-
ual differences in the “threshold of instantiation of schemata.”
For this author, there is a continuum between “external encoders”
who collect a relatively high amount of supportive evidence from
the external environment before imposing an interpretative cat-
egory (schema) on a stimulus and “internal encoders” who are
comparatively less carefully attending to the external environment
and hastily interpret situations in terms of preexisting (internal)
encoding categories. The ESQ characterizes individuals along this
continuum and therefore reflects individual differences in the
attendance to the external environment versus internal mental
processes.
There is growing evidence that being receptive to present
events and experience contributes to well-being and happiness
(for reviews, see Brown et al., 2007; Keng et al., 2011) and people
who present an internal encoding style and who are less mind-
ful indeed report lower psychological well-being and higher levels
of emotional disturbance, such as depression and anxiety (Brown
and Ryan, 2003; Lewicki, 2005; Jermann et al., 2009). Therefore, it
could be that the relationship between mind-wandering and psy-
chological distress that has been documented in previous studies is
not due to SITUT frequency per se but rather to the fact that people
who experience more mind-wandering tend to be less aware of the
present-moment. To test this hypothesis, we performed regression
and mediation analyses to investigate whether SITUT frequency
explains a significant part of the variance of psychological distress
beyond what is explained by mindful awareness and encoding
style.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 100 native French-speaking individuals (23 men) from
the Swiss general population volunteered to participate in the
study (see Table 1, sample C).
Questionnaires
Daydreaming frequency scale. See the Methods Section of “Study
1A” for a detailed description of this scale. Cronbach’s alpha for
the DDFS was 0.92 in the present study.
Mindful attention awareness scale. The MAAS is a 15-item scale
measuring the general tendency to be attentive to and aware of
present-moment experience in daily life (Brown and Ryan, 2003).
Using a six-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6
(almost never), respondents rate how often they have experiences
of acting on automatic pilot, being absorbed in one’s thoughts and
emotions, and not paying attention to ongoing sensory informa-
tion (e.g., “I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing
something else at the same time” and “I tend to walk quickly to
get where I’m going without paying attention to what I experience
along the way”). Higher scores indicate a general tendency to be
more aware of and attentive to one’s current experience, including
perceptual information, as well as one’s thoughts, emotions, and
overt behavior (French version, Jermann et al., 2009). Cronbach’s
Frontiers in Psychology | Personality Science and Individual Differences September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 363 | 8
Stawarczyk et al. Mind-wandering, psychological well-being, and present-moment awareness
alpha for the MAAS varied between 0.80 and 0.87 in the original
validation study of the scale and was 0.84 in the present study.
Internal and external encoding style questionnaire. The ESQ
was designed to assess individual differences in the tendency to
rely on information coming directly from the senses versus on pre-
existing, internal schemata in the process of perception (Lewicki,
2005). Using a six-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 6 (strongly agree), respondents rate the frequency with
which they experience “split-second illusions” in daily life, such
as seeing (erroneously) an animal running across the road, only
to find out a moment later that it was a piece of paper or a leaf
blown by the wind. The scale consists of 21 items, but only six
items (number 5, 8, 11, 15, 18, and 21) are diagnostic items; the
remaining 15 items are included to conceal the focus of the test.
Lower scores on the ESQ are indicative of an “external encoding
style,”meaning that the individual generally pays close attention to
what is happening in the external environment, while a high score
indicates an “internal encoding style,” implying that the individual
is less attentive to incoming sensory information and relies instead
more on his or her own expectations when encoding external stim-
uli. No Cronbach’s alpha was provided by Lewicki (2005) for the
original version of the ESQ. It was 0.77 in the validation study of
the French version of the scale (Billieux et al., 2009), and 0.69 in
the present study.
Patient health questionnaire-4. The PHQ-4 is a brief self-report
questionnaire of four items designed to assess depression and anx-
iety (Kroenke et al., 2009). The questionnaire begins with the stem
question: “Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been both-
ered by the following problems?” Respondents are asked to rate
each statement with reference to a four-point Likert-scale ranging
from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). Statements referring to
anxiety are “Feeling nervous, anxious, or on the edge” and “Not
being able to stop or control worrying.” Statements referring to
depression are “Feeling down, depressed or hopeless” and “Little
interest or pleasure in doing things.” This questionnaire was origi-
nally created to provide separate scores for depression and anxiety
but subsequent psychometric analyses have shown that it can also
be used as a general marker of psychological distress with a single
aggregated score (Lowe et al., 2010). Higher total scores on the
PHQ-4 indicate higher levels of psychological distress and are pre-
dictive of functional impairment, disability days, healthcare use, as
well as lower self-esteem, life satisfaction, and resilience (Kroenke
et al., 2009; Lowe et al., 2010). Given that DDFS scores were related
to both depressive and anxious symptomatology in Study 1B and
that the scores for the anxiety and depression items of the PHQ-4
were strongly correlated in the present study (r = 0.66, p< 0.01),
only the total score of the PHQ-4 was used in subsequent analyses.
Cronbach’s alpha for the total score of the PHQ-4 was 0.82 in the
original validation study of the instrument and was 0.83 in the
present study.
Procedure
See the Procedure Section of “Study 1B” for a detailed description
of the procedure used with sample C.
RESULTS
Relationships between mind-wandering, mindful awareness,
encoding style, and psychological distress
Means and standard deviations for the DDFS, MAAS, ESQ, and
PHQ-4 scores are presented in Table 1 (sample C). Correlation
analyses between the different variables are presented in Table 6.
As expected, these analyses demonstrated that individuals who
reported to experience SITUTs more frequently in their daily life
had the propensity to be less mindful of the present-moment, pre-
sented a more internally oriented encoding style, and reported
higher psychological distress. In addition, we found that psycho-
logical distress, mindful awareness, and internal encoding style
were all intercorrelated.
A set of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were per-
formed to examine whether the relationship between the DDFS
and PHQ-4 can be accounted for by the MAAS and ESQ. DDFS
scores on one hand and MAAS together with ESQ scores on
the other hand were entered in alternating order at Steps 1
and 2. As can be seen in Table 7, the final regression model
accounted for a significant proportion of variance of the PHQ-
4 (R2= 0.24, p< 0.01). Furthermore, these analyses showed that
both the MAAS and ESQ remained significant predictors of the
PHQ-4 beyond the DDFS, whereas the DDFS did not remain
a significant predictor of the PHQ-4 once the MAAS and ESQ
were entered into the regression model. These results indicate (i)
that the relationship between SITUT frequency and psychological
Table 6 | Correlation matrix of Study 2 scales (N =100, sample C).
1 2 3
DDFS
MAAS −0.37**
ESQ 0.26* −0.39**
PHQ-4 0.22* −0.43** 0.38**
DDFS, Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS, Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale; ESQ, Internal and External Encoding Style Questionnaire; PHQ-4, Patient
Health Questionnaire-4. *Significant at p<0.05 (two-tailed); **significant at
p<0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 7 | Hierarchical multiple regression analyses of Study 2 scales
(N =100, sample C).
Predictor ∆R2 Adjusted ∆R2 Standardized β
1. DDFS 0.05 0.04 0.22*
2. MAAS −0.32**
2. ESQ 0.19 0.17 0.25*
1. MAAS −0.33**
1. ESQ 0.22 0.20 0.25*
2. DDFS <0.01 <0.01 0.04
DDFS, Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS, Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale; ESQ, Internal and External Encoding Style Questionnaire; PHQ-4, Patient
Health Questionnaire-4. *Significant at p<0.05 (two-tailed); **significant at
p<0.01 (two-tailed).
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distress can be accounted for by the extent to which individuals
tend to be aware of the present-moment, (ii) that the relationship
between measures of present-moment attention and psycholog-
ical distress cannot be explained by SITUT frequency, and (iii)
that mindful awareness as well as encoding style each explain an
independent part of the variance of psychological distress.
Although this study was correlational in nature and did not
use an experimental design, we nonetheless computed a multiple
mediation model (Preacher and Hayes, 2008) to examine whether
and how the ESQ and MAAS mediate the relationship between
the DDFS and PHQ-4. A bootstrapping procedure based on 5000
resamples was used to calculate a 95% bias corrected confidence
interval (BCCI) around the total indirect effect. Values for this
BCCI were (0.088; 0.302); zero falling outside this interval indi-
cates that the total mediation effect was significant. As illustrated
in Figure 2, the direct effect of the DDFS on the PHQ-4 was not
significant once the MAAS and ESQ were taken into account as
mediating variables (β= 0.04, p= 0.66). A similar procedure was
used to calculate the specific indirect effect of the MAAS and ESQ,
which were respectively (0.029; 0.248) and (0.002; 0.169). These
results indicate that each of these scales was a significant interven-
ing variable in the mediation model beyond and above the other
one. A contrast analysis showed that the strength of the mediating
effect of the ESQ and the MAAS did not differ from each other,
with a BCCI of (−0.088; 0.243).
Finally, we also checked for the presence of gender effect
in this study. Mean comparisons showed a significant effect of
gender only for the DDFS, with women scoring higher than
men on this scale [t (98)= 2.18; p= 0.03; women= 38.77± 8.68;
men= 34.09± 10.14]; controlling for gender did not influence the
significance of the correlation, regression, and mediation analyses
reported above.
DISCUSSION
In Study 2, we further established that SITUT frequency is associ-
ated with higher psychological distress and also found, as expected,
that these thoughts are related to lower mindful awareness and
a more internally oriented encoding style. These latter results
are concordant with the perceptual decoupling hypothesis of
FIGURE 2 | Multiple mediation model of Study 2 scales. DDFS,
Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS, Mindful Attention Awareness Scale;
ESQ, Internal and External Encoding Style Questionnaire; PHQ-4, Patient
Health Questionnaire-4. Values next to each line represent the standardized
coefficient of each path. Value between rows represents the total effect of
the DDFS on the PHQ-4. *Significant at p< 0.05 (two-tailed); **significant
at p<0.01 (two-tailed).
mind-wandering, which suggests that SITUTs consume cogni-
tive resources and thus are associated with reduced processing of
ongoing perceptual information (Smallwood,2010,2011; Schooler
et al., 2011). More importantly, we found that both internal encod-
ing style and lower mindful awareness fully accounted for the
relationship between SITUT frequency and psychological distress.
Indeed, the effect size of this relationship became almost null
(standardized coefficient of 0.04) when mindful awareness and
encoding style were taken into account into the regression model,
and a multiple mediation model confirmed that the MAAS and
ESQ fully mediated the relationship between SITUT frequency and
psychological distress. On the other hand, both mindful aware-
ness and encoding style independently explained psychological
distress beyond what was already explained by SITUT frequency.
These results suggest (i) that it may not be SITUT frequency per se
that induces higher psychological distress but rather the extent to
which individuals tend to be unaware of the present-moment, (ii)
that factors other than SITUT frequency are responsible for the
relationship between the propensity to be aware of the present-
moment and psychological distress, and (iii) that some of these
factors are specific to mindful awareness and internally oriented
encoding style. These three points will be discussed further in the
Section “General discussion.”
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three studies, we first validated a French translation of the
DDFS (Giambra, 1993) and determined whether this version of
the DDFS is associated with related constructs within the gen-
eral framework of research on mind-wandering (i.e., age, future
self-thought, and“online”measures of conscious experiences sam-
pled during an attentional task). Next, we examined whether the
negative relationship that SITUTs have with mood and psycholog-
ical well-being (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) is due to SITUT
frequency per se or rather to individual differences in the extent
to which people pay attention to the present-moment. To our
knowledge, this latter analysis constitutes the first attempt to inves-
tigate the nature of the relationships between SITUT frequency,
psychological well-being, and present-moment awareness.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, in line
with previous research (Giambra and Traynor, 1978; Smallwood
et al., 2007, 2009a; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), we consis-
tently found in each study that the self-reported general frequency
with which people experience SITUTs in daily life is related to lower
psychological well-being, as indexed by negative affect and level of
psychopathological symptoms. Second, we found that SITUT fre-
quency was related to both lesser mindful awareness of the present-
moment, in keeping with previous results (Burg and Michalak,
2011; Mrazek et al., 2012), and to the tendency to present an
internally oriented encoding style (Lewicki, 2005). These findings
fit well with the idea that SITUTs consume processing resources
and, therefore, tend to be associated with reduced attention to
ongoing sensory information (Smallwood, 2010, 2011; Schooler
et al., 2011). Third, we found that the relationship between SITUT
frequency and psychological distress was fully accounted for by
the extent to which individuals tend to be aware of the present-
moment. Indeed, the strength of the association between SITUT
frequency and psychological distress became almost null once the
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influences of mindful awareness and encoding style were taken
into account. These results suggest that factors associated with
decreased attention to the present-moment may be responsible for
the negative relationship between SITUT frequency and psycho-
logical distress. Finally, mindful awareness and encoding style both
explained an independent part of the variance of psychological
distress beyond what was explained by SITUT frequency.
The latter finding suggests that mindful awareness and encod-
ing style affect psychological well-being through at least partly
distinct processes. Mindful awareness involves the ability to
decenter from one’s thoughts and view them as passing mental
events rather than to identify with them and believe thoughts
to be accurate representations of reality (Brown et al., 2007;
Keng et al., 2011). The beneficial effect of mindful awareness
in terms of psychological distress might thus be due, in part,
to the implementation of more effective emotion regulation
strategies and a capacity to detach from maladaptive self-related
thoughts (Holzel et al., 2011). A recent study using path analy-
sis indeed showed that individual differences in the ability to
regulate one’s own emotions through increased positive reap-
praisal (i.e., having thoughts whose purpose is to give a pos-
itive meaning to negative events in terms of personal growth)
and reduced self-blame (i.e., having thoughts that blame oneself
for what one has experienced) partially mediated the relation-
ship between mindful awareness and depressive symptomatology
(Jermann et al., 2009). The impact of encoding style on psy-
chological distress might result from other mechanisms, such
as “self-perpetuation” (Lewicki, 2005). It has indeed been sug-
gested (Lewicki, 2005) that internal encoders have a tendency to
persevere in erroneously interpreting stimuli on the basis of out-
dated or false schemata despite the repeated lack of supportive
evidence from the environment (e.g., a person might continue
to think he/she is particularly bad at some task despite success-
fully performing on several occasions). This self-perpetuation bias
might lead to inflexible thinking and lower psychological well-
being in a manner analogous to other well-known processes, such
as arbitrary inference (coming to conclusions without sufficient
environmental evidence) and overgeneralization (drawing overly
broad implications from single events; Lewicki, 2005; Herndon,
2008).
In addition to these distinct processes, the present results sug-
gest that a factor common to mindful awareness and encoding
style partly underlies their relationship with psychological distress.
Indeed, although both remained significant predictors, mindful
awareness, and encoding style saw a decrease in the strength of
their association with psychological distress when they were con-
sidered conjointly in the regression model; both constructs thus
shared a part of their influence on psychological distress. This
shared influence might be related to the occurrence of cognitive
failures in daily life. Several studies have shown that lower mindful
awareness (Cheyne et al., 2006; Carriere et al., 2008; Smilek et al.,
2010) and internally oriented encoding style (Herndon, 2008) are
both related to the occurrence of cognitive failures, which have in
turn been related to lower psychological well-being (e.g., Mahoney
et al., 1998; Wagle et al., 1999). Interestingly, Carriere et al. (2008)
conducted path analyses on measures of mindful awareness, psy-
chological distress, and cognitive failures. These authors found
that the best fitting model was one in which cognitive failures par-
tially mediated the relationship between mindful awareness and
psychological distress. Thus, although this proposal remains to
be investigated, it could be that the shared influence of mindful
awareness and encoding style on psychological distress is related,
in part, to the occurrence of cognitive failures.
Although the present results provide important insights into
the nature of the relationships between SITUT frequency, present-
moment awareness, and psychological well-being, several limita-
tions have to be acknowledged. First, the present studies solely
relied on retrospective self-reports of daily life experiences. Future
work should assess whether similar results can be found with
more ecological measures, for instance relying on experience sam-
pling methods (e.g., Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006) that can notably
provide a more direct measure of SITUT frequency in daily life.
Second, the PHQ-4 is a general measure of psychological distress
and more specific instruments that can discriminate between var-
ious aspects of depressive and anxious symptomatology should
be used in future studies to precisely assess which aspect(s) of
psychological distress are related to SITUT frequency and present-
moment awareness. Third, the present work did not assess the
possible influence of moderating variables in the relationship
between SITUT frequency and lower psychological well-being.
Repetitive SITUTs with abstract and negatively valenced content
have been proposed to be unconstructive and particularly pre-
dictive of lower mood and psychological distress (Watkins, 2008,
2010). Future studies should therefore assess the content of SITUTs
to determine whether experiencing constructive versus uncon-
structive SITUTs moderate the association between the frequency
of these thoughts and psychological distress. The moderating
influence of personality traits, such as psychological absorption
(Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974), might also be interesting to inves-
tigate. Finally, although the multiple mediation analyses reported
here suggest that the MASS and ESQ mediate the relationship
between the DDFS and PHQ-4, the design of the present study
was correlational and future research should employ experimen-
tal designs to assess more precisely the causal relationship between
SITUTs frequency, psychological distress, and present-moment
awareness.
In conclusion, this study validates a self-report instrument
to assess the general frequency of SITUTs in daily life and
provides preliminary evidence that the extent to which mind-
wandering negatively affects psychological well-being may not be
related to the occurrence of SITUTs per se, but could rather be
explained by a general tendency to be less attentive to the present-
moment. Interestingly, two different measures of present-moment
attention – mindful awareness and encoding style – indepen-
dently explained a part of the variance of psychological distress
beyond the contribution of SITUT frequency. We have tenta-
tively proposed that thought and emotion regulation strategies,
self-perpetuation bias, and cognitive failures might be interven-
ing processes in the relationship between psychological distress
and present-moment attention. More generally, the present find-
ings suggest that, although mind-wandering and present-moment
awareness are related constructs, they are not reducible to one
another, and are distinguishable in terms of their relationship with
psychological well-being.
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APPENDIX
A DAYDREAMING FREQUENCY SCALE
Nous vous demandons votre coopération pour répondre à un questionnaire portant sur votre tendance à rêvasser, à laisser votre esprit vagabonder et à
être perdu dans vos pensées.
Soyez attentif à bien faire la différence entre réfléchir à ce vous êtes en train de faire à un moment donné (par exemple, imaginer activement des
solutions à un problème que vous êtes en train d’essayer de résoudre sur le moment) et rêvasser sur quelque chose d’autre (par exemple, penser à
une prochaine sortie alors que vous essayez d’étudier).
Penser à une tâche alors que vous êtes en train de la réaliser n’est pas une rêverie. Par contre, penser à cette tâche à d’autres moments, par exemple
juste avant de dormir ou durant un long trajet de bus est une rêverie.
Chaque affirmation porte sur les rêveries ou sur le fait de rêvasser. Veuillez indiquer pour chacune la réponse qui vous correspond le mieux en général
en cochant la case appropriée.
1. Je rêvasse:
A. Peu fréquemment./B. Une fois par semaine./C. Une fois par jour./D. Quelques fois par jour./E. De nombreuses fois par jour.
2. Les rêveries et le vagabondage de l’esprit représentent:
A. 0% de mes pensées de la journée./B. Moins de 10% de mes pensées de la journée./C. Au moins 10% de mes pensées de la journée./D. Au moins
25% de mes pensées de la journée./E. Au moins 50% de mes pensées de la journée.
3. En ce qui concerne les rêveries, je me définirais comme quelqu’un qui:
A. Ne rêvasse jamais./B. Rêvasse très rarement./C. Rêvasse occasionnellement./D. Rêvasse modérément./E. Est un rêveur invétéré.
4. Je me rappelle de mes rêveries ou je réfléchis à mes rêveries:
A. Peu fréquemment./B. Une fois par semaine./C. Une fois par jour./D. Quelques fois par jour./E. De nombreuses fois par jour.
5. Quand je ne prête pas beaucoup d’attention à un travail, à un livre ou à la tv, j’ai tendance à rêvasser:
A. 0% du temps./B. 10% du temps./C. 25% du temps./D. 50% du temps./E. 75% du temps.
6. A la place de faire attention aux gens et aux évènements autours de moi, je passe:
A. 0% de mon temps perdu dans mes pensées./B. Moins de 10% de mon temps perdu dans mes pensées./C. Au moins 10% de mon temps perdu dans
mes pensées./D. Au moins 25% de mon temps perdu dans mes pensées./E. Au moins 50% de mon temps perdu dans mes pensées.
7. Je rêvasse au travail ou en cours:
A. Peu fréquemment./B. Une fois par semaine./C. Une fois par jour./D. Quelques fois par jour./E. De nombreuses fois par jour.
8. Me souvenir du passé, penser au futur, ou imaginer des évènements inhabituels occupe:
A. 0% de mes pensées de la journée./B. Moins de 10% de mes pensées de la journée./C. Au moins 10% de mes pensées de la journée./D. Au moins
25% de mes pensées de la journée./E. Au moins 50% de mes pensées de la journée.
9. Je me perds dans des rêveries:
A. Peu fréquemment./B. Une fois par semaine./C. Une fois par jour./D. Quelques fois par jour./E. De nombreuses fois par jour.
10. Je rêvasse à chaque fois que j’ai du temps liber:
A. Jamais./B. Rarement./C. Parfois./D. Fréquemment./E. Toujours.
11. Je rêvasse au lieu de faire attention lorsque j’assiste à une réunion ou à un spectacle qui n’est pas très intéressant:
A. Jamais./B. Rarement./C. Parfois./D. Fréquemment./E. Toujours.
12. Je rêvasse lors d’un long trajet en bus, train, ou avion:
A. Jamais./B. Rarement./C. Parfois./D. Fréquemment./E. La plupart du temps
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B FUTURE SELF THOUGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE
Veuillez indiquer dans quelle mesure chacun des énoncés suivants décrit votre manière de penser ou d’agir, en encerclant un chiffre entre 1 (pas du tout
vrai pour moi) et 6 (tout à fait vrai pour moi). Il n’y a pas de bonne ou de mauvaise réponse, veuillez décrire ce qui est vrai pour vous.
1. Mon futur me paraît vague et incertain.
2. Je m’imagine souvent dans le futur de différentes façons et je pense aux diverses voies qui pourraient me conduire à ces différents futurs.
3. Je trouve vraiment difficile de prédire ce à quoi je pourrais ressembler dans le futur.
4. Le fait de penser à moi dans le futur provoque souvent en moi de fortes émotions (qu’elles soient de joie ou de tristesse).
5. Les images que j’ai de moi dans le futur sont très floues, pas claires du tout.
6. Lorsque je rêvasse, je me vois souvent tel que je pourrais être dans le futur.
7. Je passe fréquemment du temps à penser à ce que je pourrais être dans des périodes futures de ma vie.
8. J’ai tendance à m’égarer dans des pensées où j’imagine des futurs possibles pour moi.
9. Lorsque je m’imagine dans le futur, je vois des images claires et vivaces.
10. Mon futur est trop incertain pour que je puisse faire des projets très longtemps à l’avance.
11. J’ai tendance à penser à ce que je pourrais être dans le futur, même quand je ne souhaite pas penser à cela.
www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 363 | 15
